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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
The Utah Society of the American Institute of Architects (AIA Utah), 
American Council of Engineering Companies (ACEC), and Associated General 
Contractors (AGC), submit this amicus brief regarding the application of the 
economic loss rule to defective design and construction claims. These amici parties 
are state or state chapters of national organizations involved in the design and 
construction industry in Utah. These amici parties are filing this brief in support of 
defendants/appellees and request this Court to keep the economic loss rule in its 
current form in order to preclude a non-intentional tort claim for defective design 
and construction. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-
102. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Amici adopt the statement of issues and standards of review in 
defendants'/appellees' brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Amici adopt the statement of facts in defendants'/appellees' brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Amici adopt the statement of the case in defendants'/appellees' brief. 
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STATUTE WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE 
APPEAL 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-513 (Utah 2008) 
1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), an action for defective design or 
construction is limited to breach of the contract, whether written or otherwise, 
including both express and implied warranties. 
2) An action for defective design or construction may include damage to other 
property or physical personal injury if the damage or injury is caused by the 
defective design or construction. 
3) For purpose of Subsection (2), property damage does not include: 
(a) the failure of construction to function as designed; or 
(b) diminution of the value of the constructed property because of the defective 
design or construction. 
4) Except as provided in Subsection (2) and (6), an action for defective design or 
construction may be brought only by a person in privity of contract with the 
original contractor, architect, engineer, or the real estate developer. 
5) If a person in privity of contract sues for defective design or construction under 
this section, nothing in this section precludes the person from bringing, in the same 
suit, another cause of action to which the person is entitled based on an intentional 
or willful breach of a duty existing in law. 
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6) Nothing in this section precludes a person from assigning a right under a contract 
to another person, including to a subsequent owner or a homeowners association. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Under existing Utah law, a party may not assert a non-intentional tort claim to 
recover purely economic losses resulting from defective design or construction. An 
exception to this rule exists when a party can demonstrate an independent duty exists that 
arises separate from the design or construction entity's contractual obligations. An 
independent duty may exist where a direct relationship between parties requires one party 
possessing superior knowledge to disclose, when asked, any known and material defects. 
Utah law does not impose an independent duty to design or construct a defect free 
structure or residence. A claim for defective design and construction must be asserted 
through a breach of contract claim, as construction and real estate purchase contracts 
govern the parties' economic expectations and allocations of economic risk. 
Although Utah law has created a workable standard that allows parties to freely 
negotiate and allocate economic risks and economic expectations, plaintiff and its 
supporting amicus request this Court to overturn a long line of cases establishing this rule. 
Under plaintiffs rule of law, design and construction entities cannot enter into a contract 
to define economic risks because such negotiated contractual provisions could be avoided 
through a non-intentional tort claim asserted by a party to the contract who found itself 
dissatisfied with the contract or by a third party whom the design and construction entity 
had never contemplated. Moreover, plaintiff requests this Court to adopt a rule that is 
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contrary to a statute governing defective design and construction claims that was enacted 
in 2008. This Court should affirm the trial court's rulings that correctly applied the 
economic loss rule to bar plaintiffs claims in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
L Utah's economic loss rule is well defined and allows parties to 
enter into negotiated agreements to define each parties' economic 
risks and expectations. 
This Court should not reverse American Towers, and it should reaffirm the 
application of the economic loss rule to preclude recovery of economic loss through a tort 
claim for negligent design and construction. Although plaintiff and its supporting amicus 
(collectively referred to as plaintiff) give short shrift to the Utah Legislature's new 
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-513 effectively precludes the relief that plaintiff seeks -
namely the ability to recover in tort for economic losses for defective design and 
construction. Rather than overturn a decade's worth of jurisprudence and enact a rule of 
law contrary to a newly enacted statute as plaintiff requests, this Court should keep a rule 
of law that allows parties to freely negotiate and allocate risks as the parties' 
circumstances require. 
In its current state, Utah's economic loss rule bars a party from asserting a non-
intentional tort claim for defective design and construction. Recent decisions have carved 
out exceptions to this rule when a party owes an independent duty of care; however, 
Utah's appellate courts have only imposed a duty when the parties' relationship requires 
one party to disclose known and material facts. In this case, as in most design and 
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construction defect cases, plaintiff has not alleged the builder or developer knew that 
defective design or construction caused the alleged water intrusion, nor has plaintiff 
alleged that defendants knew that defective soil conditions existed. The allegations are 
that defective design and construction caused water intrusion. In short, this case is nearly 
identical to American Towers. The same policy considerations that supported this Court's 
opinion in American Towers still apply, and as a consequence, this Court should affirm 
the trial court's rulings. 
In order to fully understand why the economic loss rule applies to this case and 
how Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-513 fits with this Court's opinions on the economic loss 
rule, a thorough understanding of the evolution of the economic loss rule in Utah is 
necessary: 
a. Utah adopts the economic loss rule to preclude recovery of 
economic losses for negligent design and construction of homes. 
In 1994, the Utah Court of Appeals adopted the economic loss rule to bar recovery 
of economic losses through a non-intentional tort claim, noting it was the "majority 
position." See Maack v. Resource Design & Construction, Inc., 875 P.2d 570, 579-80 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citing East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 
476 U.S. 858, 866-75, 106 S. Ct. 2295 (1986)). In Maack, the Court of Appeals 
precluded a subsequent homeowner from asserting tort claims for negligent design and 
construction against the original homebuilder with whom the subsequent homeowner 
lacked contractual privity. See id. at 581. In reaching this decision, the Court of Appeals 
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stated that the economic loss rule was premised on the inherent differences between tort 
and contract law. The Court of Appeals stated: "Contract law protects expectancy 
interests created through agreement between the parties, while tort law protects 
individuals and their property from physical harm by imposing a duty to exercise 
reasonable care." Id. at 580. 
A few months after Maack, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed Maack in Schafir v. 
Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1388 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Schafir, like Maack, involved a 
subsequent homeowner's claims against the original builder for latent defects in the 
design and construction of a single family residence. See id. The plaintiff in Schafir cited 
to the Colorado opinion, Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Weller, 663 P.2d 1041, 1044 
(Colo. 1983) to argue that economic losses are recoverable in negligent construction 
cases. See id. at 1388 and n.9. The Court of Appeals declined plaintiffs invitation to 
follow the Colorado rule in Cosmopolitan Homes, and instead, the Court of Appeals 
followed its prior opinion in Maack. See id. Accordingly, after Maack and Schafir, the 
economic loss rule precluded recovery in tort for defective design and construction of a 
single family home. 
b. The Utah Supreme Court expands the economic loss rule to bar a 
condominium owners association's claims against design and 
construction entities. 
In American Towers, the plaintiff, a condominium owners association like plaintiff 
in this case, asserted claims against the contractors for design and construction defects in 
the plumbing and mechanical systems in the condominium complex. See American 
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Towers Owners Association v. CCIMechanical Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah 1996). 
Like the plaintiff in this case, the American Towers owners association lacked privity of 
contract with the contractors. The damages sought in American Towers included the cost 
of repairing the alleged defects and the diminution in value of the condominiums due to 
the alleged defects. See id. Much like the claims in the present case, the plaintiff in 
American Towers asserted claims premised on theories of intended third-party 
beneficiary, negligence, and breach of warranty. See id. 
Applying the economic loss rule to the claims, this Court rejected the American 
Towers owner association's claims. See id. First, this Court rejected any notion that the 
actual owers of the condominium units or the condominium owners association were 
intended third party beneficiaries to the design and construction contracts. See id. at 
1188. Absent an express provision in the design and construction contracts evidencing an 
intent to make a third party an intended beneficiary of the contract, the subsequent owners 
and the association, even though known to exist, were not third party beneficiaries and 
had no contractual or warranty claims. See id. 
This Court then turned to the application of the economic loss rule to negligent 
design and construction claims in the context of a large condominium complex. See id. at 
1189-90. First, this Court rejected arguments that the association's claims for negligent 
design and construction of the plumbing and mechanical systems constituted negligent 
design of a product rather than the negligent design and construction of improvements to 
real property. See id. This Court expressly held that the association's negligent design 
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and construction of the plumbing and mechanical systems was not a negligent 
manufacture of a product. See id. at 1190. Moreover, this Court went on to clarify that 
damage to walls and personal property as a result of the defective plumbing does not 
constitute damage to "other property." See id. at 1191. This Court stated: "the 'property' 
was the entire complex itself that was constructed as an integrated unit under one general 
contract." Id. 
Like the plaintiff in this case, the American Towers owners association argued that 
the economic loss rule unfairly allowed the builders of defective housing to avoid liability 
for negligent design and construction. See id. at 1190. This Court disagreed, stating: 
"Builders who construct low quality housing that does not cause injury to persons or 
property may still be held liable for damages, but that liability should be defined by the 
contract between the parties." Id. This Court went on to state: "The law of torts imposes 
no standards on the parties' performance of the contract; the only standards are those 
agreed upon by the parties. Tort law is concerned only with the safety of a product or an 
action." Id. This Court emphasized the important policy justification for the economic 
loss rule: "Otherwise, the extension of tort law would result in 'liability in an 
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.'" Id. 
Instead, this Court determined that the economic loss rule was particularly well 
suited to claims of negligent construction. See id. "Construction projects are 
characterized by detailed and comprehensive contracts that form the foundation of the 
industry's operations. Contracting parties are free to adjust their respective obligations to 
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satisfy their mutual expectations." Id. In short, this Court reaffirmed the principle that 
the parties are free to negotiate their own contracts, and contracts set the parties' 
economic expectations and exposures. See id. 
In the case of a party who purchases a single family residence, a unit in a 
condominium, or a residence in a planned unit development, the remedy is the same. The 
buyer enters into a contract to purchase the residence from a prior owner, a builder, or a 
developer. "A buyer can avoid economic loss resulting from defective construction by 
obtaining a thorough inspection of the property prior to purchase and then by either 
obtaining insurance or by negotiating a warranty or reduction in price to reflect the risk of 
any hidden defects." Id. In summary, this Court rejected the owners association's claims, 
stating: "To allow the claim would be to impose the [homeowners'] economic 
expectations upon parties whom the [homeowners] did not know and with whom they did 
not deal and upon contracts to which they were not a party." Id. at 1192. In short, this 
Court addressed and rejected each argument that plaintiff asserted to the trial court and 
now on appeal. Plaintiff has offered no factual, legal, or policy reason to justify a 
different outcome than this Court's previous decision in American Towers. 
c. This Court reaffirms that the economic loss rule precludes a 
negligent design and construction claims that seek to recover purely 
economic losses. 
In SME Industries, Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback and Associates, Inc., 
this Court applied the economic loss rule to preclude a subcontractor's claims against 
design entities where the parties lacked privity of contract. See id., 2001 UT 54, ^31-45, 
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28 P.3d 669. Affirming its reasoning in American Towers, this Court noted that "all 
parties to a construction project, not just the buyers and developers at issue in American 
Towers, resort to contracts and contract law to protect their economic expectations.55 Id. 
at f 36. In summary, this Court held: "to maintain the fundamental boundary between tort 
and contract law, we hold that when parties have contracted, as in the construction 
industry, to protect against economic liability, contract principles override the tort 
principles enunciated in section 552 of the Restate (Second) of Torts and, thus, economic 
losses are not recoverable." Id. at f 44. Thus, this Court affirmed that the economic loss 
rule was particularly well-suited to defective design and construction claims and barred 
plaintiffs tort claims. 
d. This Court adopts the independent duty exception to the economic 
loss rule. 
Shortly after SME, this Court carved out an exception to the economic loss rule 
that allows recovery for unintentional torts when an independent duty exists between the 
parties. See Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, \\1, 48 P.3d 235. In Hermansen, the 
buyers of a newly constructed home asserted negligence claims against a real estate 
broker and his agent for failing to disclose a known and material fact that the soil 
composition was not suitable for residential construction. See id. In Hermansen, this 
Court noted that plaintiffs' claims were not premised on any contract or third party 
beneficiary theory. See id. at 14. Therefore, this Court distinguished both American 
Towers and SME. See id. This Court stated that Hermansen was not a case where "all 
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respective rights of the parties are negotiated and risk appropriately designated in a 
written instrument." Id. Rather, "[t]he relationship at issue is a direct relationship 
between buyers, a real estate broker, and his agent who allegedly failed to properly 
discharge their professional duties." Id. In short, this Court expressly noted that the 
claim was not for faulty construction of a new residence as in American Towers, Schafir, 
and Maack. Id. at f^ 15. 
Relying on two recent Colorado cases that adopted the economic loss rale, this 
Court adopted an interpretation of the economic loss rale that focuses on the source of the 
duty that was allegedly breached. See id. at f 16 {citing Grynberg v. Agric. Tech., Inc., 10 
P.3d 1267 (Colo. 2000); Town of Alma v. Azco Constr., Inc. 10 P.3d 1256 (Colo. 2000)). 
This Court adopted Colorado's approach with respect to the independent duty exception 
to the economic loss rale that provides: "The proper focus in an analysis under the 
economic loss rale is on the source of the duties alleged to have been breached. Thus, our 
formulation of the economic loss rale is that a party suffering only economic loss from 
the breach of an express or implied contractual duty may not assert a tort claim for such a 
breach absent an independent duty of care under tort law.'" Id. {quoting Grynberg, 10 
P.3d at 1269). 
In Hermansen, this Court expressly recognized that no contract governed the 
parties' relationship. See id. at [^14. Thus, the source of any alleged duty could not be 
contractually based. This Court then examined the common law duties that real estate 
professionals owe to the general public. See id. at Tff 18-22. Relying on past opinions, 
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this Court reinforced that real estate professionals owe the public a duty to act honestly, 
ethically, and competently. See id. This Court concluded that the real estate agents in the 
case owed no duty to independently inspect each property they sold; however, they 
breached the duty to be honest and ethical when they failed to disclose a known and 
material defect regarding the soil conditions in the lot sold to plaintiff See id. at ^23. 
Nothing in Hermansen indicated an intent to allow a party to assert a defective design or 
construction claim through the independent duty exception. Rather, this Court 
specifically distinguished Hermansen from a case where a contract existed and defined 
the parties' relationship. 
e. Utah Court of Appeals applies the independent duty exception. 
After this Court adopted the independent duty exception to the economic loss rule, 
the Court of Appeals applied this exception to hold that: (1) homebuilder and developer 
did not owe the buyer an independent duty with respect to disclosing possibility of 
mudslide on property, see Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT App 291, {^^ [13-15, 77 P.3d 339; 
and (2) real estate appraiser owed buyer an independent duty of care with respect to 
preparation and accuracy of appraisal of property, see West v. Inter-Financial, Inc., 2006 
UT App 222, U119-28, 139 P.3d 1059. The Court of Appeals' opinions in Fennell and 
West set forth the factors used to determine when an independent duty may exist and the 
limitations on the duty. 
In West, the Court of Appeals went to great lengths to demonstrate why the 
relationship between the builder, developer, and buyer in Fennell was more analogous to 
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the relationship in American Towers. See id. at ^19-25. Accordingly, the Court of 
Appeals concluded the buyer in Fennell could have protected himself through contractual 
allocation of risks as in American Towers. See Fennell, 2003 UT App 291 at ^15; West, 
2006 UT App 222 at ^[22-25. Moreover, plaintiffs evidence did not indicate that the 
builder and developer knew of the potential for mudslide and failed to disclose it. See 
Fennell, 2003 UT 291 at f 12. In Fennell, the parties' relationship was well suited to 
arms-length contracts, and the record did not indicate a failure to disclose any known and 
material defects. 
In contrast, the Court of Appeals concluded the buyers in West could not have 
entered into a contract with the appraiser. See West, 2006 UT App 222 at |^22 Because 
the seller's selected and contracted with the appraiser, the appraiser owed an independent 
duty to the buyer's that was analogous to the duty a real estate agent owed to the public in 
Hermansen. See West, 2006 UT App 222 at ^|25. 
When determining whether the independent duty exception applies, the analysis 
turns on the source of the duties and whether the source is contractual or independent of 
contract. See Hermansen, 2002 UT 52 at ^16. The analysis focuses on the parties' 
relationship (more specifically whether the parties could have entered into a contract to 
allocate risks) and whether or not one party failed to disclose a known fact. Compare 
Fennell, 2003 UT App 291 at |^12 (no evidence existed that builder and developer knew 
that possibility of mudslide existed); with Hermansen, 2002 UT 52 at |^23 (real estate 
professionals owed no duty to go out and discover facts, rather real estate professionals 
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owed a duty to disclose known and material facts). In West, the Court of Appeals' 
decision was based largely on the fact that the buyer's could not contract with the 
appraiser that the seller's selected and that the appraisal report misrepresented the actual 
square footage of the home, which was an easily discoverable fact in the exercise of an 
appraiser's duty of care. See West, 2006 UT App 222 at ^|25. In summary, the 
availability of a contract and disclosure of known facts determined whether an 
independent duty was owed. 
f. This Court expands the independent duty exception to find that 
homebuilders and developers owe buyers of newly constructed homes a 
limited duty to disclose a known and material defect. 
L Smith v. Frandsen 
In Smith v. Frandsen, this Court addressed whether a buyer could sue a remote 
developer for failing to disclose improper soil compaction at a residential home site. See 
id., 2004 UT 55, % 16, 94 P.3d 919. In Smith, this Court concluded the developer may 
have owed a duty to disclose the soil condition to a purchaser of the land; however, this 
Court concluded that where the purchaser was a builder, the duty to disclose to a 
subsequent purchaser ended with the builder. See id. at f^lj 18-24. In other words, because 
the developer's relationship was with the builder, who was also a sophisticated party, the 
developer's duty to disclose facts did not continue indefinitely to include the remote 
buyer. See id. Because the builder knew or should have known of the soil condition, the 
developer's duties ended with the builder. See id. In reaching this conclusion, this Court 
stated: "we believe our holding will encourage builders and contractors to exercise that 
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level of care consistent with the expertise legally imputed to them." Id. at }^27. 
Importantly, this Court reinforced the importance of the parties' relationships with one 
another and the parties' ability to freely negotiate for allocation of risks, stating: "By 
requiring plaintiffs generally to sue up the chain of title, the allocation of risks and 
expectations embodied in land sale contracts will be preserved." Id. Accordingly, this 
Court reinforced the policy considerations expressed in Maack, Schafir, American 
Towers, and SME in the context of residential construction. The remote purchasers had 
an available remedy, and that remedy was against the builder with whom the remote 
purchaser was in privity of contract. 
//. Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp. 
Relying on Smith, this Court clarified the application of the independent duty 
exception to require a homebuiider to disclose known facts to a buyer with whom the 
builder has a direct relationship. See Yazdv. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, f24, 
143 P.3d 283. In Yazd, this Court stated that the duty that builders owe to direct buyers as 
two parts: (1) "to insure that the subdivided lots are suitable for construction of some 
type of ordinary, average dwelling house;" and (2) to "disclose to his purchaser any 
condition which he knows or reasonably ought to know makes the subdivided lots 
unsuitable for such residential building." See id. at %LA. Accordingly, Yazd does not 
impose an independent duty on design and construction entities to build a defect free 
home. See id. Rather, the parties' construction or real estate purchase contract governs 
any design or construction defects. Yazd requires a homebuiider to disclose known and 
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material facts to a purchaser with whom the builder has a direct relationship in certain 
instances. 
///. Moore v. Smith 
In Moore v. Smith, the Court of Appeals applied Yazd to the claims of a buyer 
against a homebuilder. See id., 2007 UT App 101, Uf32-36, 158 P.3d 562. In Moore, 
plaintiffs argued that the homebuilder failed to disclose a known defect with respect to 
the home's footings and foundation. Addressing plaintiffs' fraudulent nondisclosure 
claim for the home's footings and foundations, the Court of Appeals relied on Yazd to 
state the duty owed and requirements for recovering on a fraudulent nondisclosure claim: 
(1) a legal duty to communicate, (2) undisclosed material information, and (3) a showing 
that the information was known to the party who failed to disclose. See id. at Tf33. In 
Moore, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed that a builder owes a legal duty to communicate 
material information that is known to the builder to a party with whom the builder has a 
direct relationship. See id. at T[35. 
In addition to the fraudulent nondisclosure claim, the homeowners also asserted a 
breach of contract claim. The breach of contract claim was based on several building 
code violations that the buyer discovered after moving into the home. The buyer's breach 
of contract claim was based on two premises: (1) the seller's contractual disclosures 
failed to identify the building code violations in the home, and (2) because the seller was 
also the builder, the law imputed knowledge of the building code requirements to the 
seller. See id. at ^[37-38. The Court of Appeals agreed that homebuilders are imputed 
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knowledge of the building codes. See id. at f 38. Thus, the Court of Appeals allowed the 
claims for defective design and construction as breach of contract claims, not tort claims. 
See id. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not expand the independent duty 
exception to impose a duty to design and construct a defect free home. 
g. In the 2008 legislative session, the Utah Legislature enacts a statute 
limiting claims for defective design and construction to claim for 
breach of contract. 
Consistent with this Court's past rulings, the Utah Legislature passed Senate bill 
220 which precludes a party from asserting a tort claim for defective design and 
construction. Specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-513 provides: "Except as provided 
in Subsection (2), an action for defective design or construction is limited to breach of the 
contract, whether written or otherwise, including both express and implied warranties." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-513(l). Consistent with general tort law, subsection (2) excepts 
claims for personal injury or damage to "other property." See id. at -513(2). Subsection 
(3) then clarifies subsection (2) by providing: "property damage does not include: (a) the 
failure of construction to function as designed; or (b) diminution of the value of the 
constructed property because of the defective design or construction." See id. at -513(3); 
see also American Towers, 930 P.2d at 1184, 1190 (defining property damage 
requirement for a tort claim). Subsection (4) further requires a person asserting a 
defective design or construction claim to be in privity of contract with the design and 
construction party. See id. at -513(4); see also Smith, 2004 UT 55 at }^27 (requiring 
plaintiff to sue up the chain of title). Subsection (5) removes intentional tort claims from 
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the statute's provisions. See id. at -513(5). Finally, subsection (6) allows a party in 
privity of contract to assign its claims to another entity, including a homeowners 
association. See id. at -513(6). 
To the extent plaintiff and its amicus seek to overturn American Towers and have 
this Court conclude that the economic loss rule does not preclude a non-intentional tort 
claim for defective design and construction, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-513 precludes the 
requested relief in this case. Like this Court's statement in Smith v. Frandsen, requiring 
plaintiffs to sue up the chain of title, the Utah Legislature has expressed an unequivocal 
requirement that claims for defective design and construction are limited to breach of 
contract claims. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-513; Smith, 2004 UT 55 at ^|27. As such, 
only those parties in privily of contract, either directly or through an assignment, may 
assert a claim. Accordingly, the Utah Legislature enacted a statutory rule consistent with 
this Court's analysis in American Towers, SME, Yazd, and Smith. This Court should not 
overturn American Towers, but rather should affirm the trial court's proper application of 
the economic loss rule to bar plaintiffs claims in this case. 
II. Colorado's economic loss rule, like Utah's, requires a Court to 
first determine the source of the duty. 
This Court should not follow the Colorado rule announced in A. C Excavating v. 
Yacht Club IIHomeowner's Association, Inc., 114 P.3d 862 (Colo. 2005) because the 
Colorado rule conflicts with Utah's defective construction cause of action statute and 
creates an inconsistent rule depending on the circumstances of the case. This Court has 
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created a sound rule that allows parties to freely negotiate contracts for the construction 
and sale of real property. Moreover, this Court has carved out narrow exceptions that 
create well-defined and equitable independent duties of care between parties. Consistent 
with this Court's approach, the Utah Legislature passed a bill that clearly defines how a 
cause of action for defective design and construction may be asserted. 
Under Utah's independent duty exception, the economic loss rule will not bar a 
claim for negligence that seeks to recover solely economic losses when a party owes an 
independent duty of care that arises separate from that parties' contractual duty of care. 
See Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, ^ |17, 48 P.3d 235. Plaintiff argues that the 
builder and developer owed it an independent duty to construct a structure free from 
defects and cites to Yacht Club II for support. While it is true that Utah recognizes a 
narrow exception to economic loss rule when a party owes an independent duty, the 
independent duty exception is not applicable in this case where the builder's and 
developer's duties arise solely from the construction contracts and any subsequent real 
estate purchase contracts. In short, plaintiff reads the "independent" requirement out of 
the independent duty exception and requests this Court to do the same. 
In Hermansen v. Tasulis, this Court modified Utah's economic loss rule in order to 
create a narrow exception to the general bar on recovery of solely economic damages 
when a duty exists that is independent of and separate from the contractual duties. See 
Hermansen, 2002 UT 52, [^17, 48 P.3d 235. In creating this exception, however, the 
Court did not abandon the original concept behind the economic loss rule, and stated: 
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"[t]he proper focus in an analysis under the economic loss rule is on the source of the 
duties alleged to have been breached." Hermansen, 2002 UT 52 at ffl[15-16 {quoting 
Grynberg v. Agric. Tech, Inc., 10 P.3d 1267, 1269 (Colo. 2000) (emphasis added)). The 
Utah Supreme Court has modeled Utah's economic loss rule on the Colorado rule. See 
Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, Iff 15-16 (quoting Grynberg, 10 P.3d at 1269). The 
Colorado Supreme Court explained the Colorado rule in a later case: 
Our economic loss rule requires the court to focus on the contractual 
relationship between the parties, rather than their professional status, in 
determining the existence of an independent duty of care. The interrelated 
contracts contained [defendant's] duty of care. [Plaintiffs] tort claims are 
based on duties that are imposed by contract and therefore, contract law 
provides the remedies. 
BRW, Inc. v. Dufficy & Sons, Inc., 99 P.3d 66, 67-68 (Colo. 2004) (addressing multiple 
inter-related contracts between commercially sophisticated parties on a large construction 
project). In advocating for this Court to overturn American Towers and to follow the 
Colorado rule in Yacht Club II, plaintiff has failed to address the BRW opinion and its 
effect on Colorado's economic loss rule. 
In order to determine if the independent duty exception applies, a two-step analysis 
is used: (1) are the losses purely economic, and (2) what is the source of the duty being 
imposed. See Gulf stream Aerospace Services Corp. v. United States Aviation 
Underwriters, Inc., 635 S.E.2d 38, 44 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (applying Utah's economic loss 
rule and finding source of duty was contractual rather than independent). If the losses are 
purely economic and the source of the duty is contractual, "it is improper to further 
analyze the existence of an independent tort duty in determining whether an economic 
20 
loss may be recovered." See id. In short, after determining the losses are purely 
economic, the next step is to look at the contract to determine if it provides the source of 
the duties being alleged. If a contract is the source of the duties alleged, the court does 
not need to determine if a parallel or overlapping duty exists. See id.; see also BRW, 99 
P.3d at 67-68. 
Although BRW was not overruled in Yacht Club II, plaintiff only refers this Court 
to Yacht Club II as setting forth the economic loss rule in Colorado. BRW, however, is 
still good law in Colorado, and it is more consistent with Utah's approach to the 
economic loss rule. In contrast, Yacht Club II is based on case law previously rejected in 
Utah. In Yacht Club II, the Colorado Supreme Court relied on its prior precedent in 
Cosmopolitan Homes to find that homebuilders owe a duty of care to construct homes 
free from defects. See Yacht Club II, 114 P.3d at 867. Thus, under Cosmopolitan Homes, 
a homeowner may assert a tort claim for defective design and construction claim against a 
builder. See id. In Schafir, however, the Utah Court of Appeals rejected the Colorado 
rule set forth in Cosmopolitan Homes. Schafir, 879 P.2d at 1388 and n.9. Thereafter, 
Utah has not adopted any rule allowing a tort claim for defective design and construction. 
Furthermore, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-513 is contrary to the Colorado rule in Yacht Club 
II and Cosmopolitan Homes. Finally, in Colorado, the economic loss rule is becoming 
inconsistent and unclear depending on which case is used. Compare BRW, 99 P.3d at 67-
68 (if contract is source of duty, then no independent duty to design and construct a defect 
free structure); with Yacht Club II, 114 P.3d at 867 (builders owe an independent duty to 
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construct a home free from defects, regardless of whether a contract exists). Because the 
Colorado rule in Yacht Club II conflicts with this Court's past opinions and with a 
recently enacted Utah statute, this Court should not follow the Colorado rule Yacht Club 
II. Further, even if the Colorado rule did not conflict with Utah's economic loss rule and 
construction defect statute, this Court should not adopt a rule that would create a 
confusing and unworkable economic loss rule in Utah. 
III. Eliminating the economic loss rule in Utah will subject design 
and construction entities to liability for an indeterminate amount for 
an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. 
As set forth in the Summary of Argument, Utah has a clearly defined economic 
loss rule that has evolved and adapted over the last 14 years. In its current form, Utah's 
economic loss rule allows parties to freely negotiate economic risks and expectations 
through contract without fear that the contractual remedies will be side-stepped through a 
tort claim. Utah has kept clearly defined boundaries between tort and contract law in 
order to protect parties' expectancy interests. As in Utah, many jurisdictions have 
wrestled with the economic loss rule, and it has been adopted in several different forms. 
See, e.g., The Economic Loss Doctrine in Construction Cases: Are the Odds for Design 
Professionals Better in Vegas?, Beth M. Andrus, James L. Gessford, and William R. 
Joyce, 2 No. 1 ACCLJ 2 (2008). Whereas some decisions bemoan the lack of consistency 
with which the rule is applied depending upon the state, Utah has consistently adhered to 
the economic loss rule with only minor modifications as deemed appropriate. 
Now plaintiff requests this Court to overrule its American Towers decision and 
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effectively eliminate the economic loss rule as a defense. With the economic loss rule in 
place, design and construction entities understand that they are free to negotiate for 
certain economic expectations and risks. The construction industry is a contract based 
industry that relies on arms-length negotiations to define a parties' risks, duties, and 
obligations to one another. If the economic loss rule is eliminated, design and 
construction entities will face confusion and uncertainty as to economic risks and 
exposures on each project they pursue. 
In a large construction project, the entities involved in the design and construction 
have varying roles with respect to their risks and the level of involvement. A building 
contractor may have a very large role in the case of the general contractor who oversees 
the entire project, or a very minor role in the case of a subcontractor who only provides 
task specific labor or materials for a discrete portion of the project. Similarly, an engineer 
may have a large role if retained to provide the structural design for the entire project, or a 
much smaller role if the engineer is only responsible for the civil design of common areas 
or the project's lighting design. Based on the risk assumed and the level of involvement, 
the parties will negotiate appropriate fees for services rendered and also appropriate 
protections for risks and exposures through required insurance coverage and limitation of 
liability clauses contained in the parties' negotiated contracts. 
With the economic loss rule and its contractual protections, any of these entities 
may negotiate a contract to govern its economic expectations. In the case of an engineer 
who provides structural design for a large commercial building, the contract will 
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compensate the engineer appropriately for the large role the engineer has in the project 
and correspondingly will take into account the larger possible economic exposure for an 
error or omission in the structural design. In other words, the compensation is 
commensurate to the exposure on the project. Furthermore, the engineer may be 
contractually required to have a minimum amount of insurance coverage to cover an error 
or omission. 
These contractual protections break down when the economic loss rule is removed 
and an entity may be sued in tort. Take for example a geotechnical engineer on a large 
project. The engineer may have the minor task of providing a soils report for the project. 
The owner of the project is free to negotiate the fee for this work. The owner for a 
myriad of reasons is free to negotiate down the engineer's fee for its services on the 
project. For a fee of $28,500, the owner and engineer may agree to have the geotechnical 
work performed. Because the fee is only $28,500 and was negotiated down from the 
engineer's customary fee, the owner and engineer may also agree on a contractual 
limitation of liability clause of $50,000. The owner and engineer have an arms-length 
bargain for the appropriate compensation based on engineer's contractual duties and 
potential exposure. 
As it turns out, the engineers work is deficient. Earth movement beyond that 
predicted by the engineer's geotechnical report occurs and causes extensive damage to the 
structure and corresponding delays to construction. The engineer now faces a $60 million 
negligence claim on a contract that paid the engineer $28,500 and which contained a 
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limitation of liability clause of $50,000. The above scenario is a real case. See, e.g., 
Terracon Consultants Western, Inc. v. Mandalay Resort Group, No. 47844 (currently 
pending before the Nevada Supreme Court); see also Andrus, Gessford, and Joyce, 2 No. 
1 ACCLJ 2 at 1. In that case, despite negotiating down the engineer's fee in exchange for 
a limitation of liability clause, the owner is seeking to avoid the contractual limitations on 
its claim by asserting a tort claim. The owner is arguing the economic loss rule should 
not bar its tort claim. 
Rather than opening up design and construction entities to "liability in an 
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class" as rejected in 
American Towers, this Court should keep the economic loss rule in its current state in 
place. The economic loss rule provides some level of certainty to those entities involved 
in the construction industry. Furthermore, it preserves the boundaries between tort law 
and contract. In short, the policy reasons that led this Court to adopt the economic loss 
rule are as strong now as they were in 1996. Plaintiff has articulated no policy reasons to 
justify a wholesale abrogation of the economic loss rule in Utah. Rather, plaintiff argues 
for abrogation of the rule for the limited purpose of its own needs in this particular case 
without any explanation of why the individual owners could not or did not protect their 
own interests through a negotiated contract. A remedy at law existed in this case. The 
individual owners had the ability to conduct due diligence and contract for the allocation 
of risks. If a breach occurred, the owners' remedy, as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-
4-513, was a breach of contract claim. 
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IV. This Court should reject plaintiffs request for implied 
warranties. 
The parties to construction contracts and real estate purchase contract can 
negotiate contractual provisions and express warranties to better address the parties' 
expectations and duties of care. Because defective design and construction claims must 
be contractual, see Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-513, this Court does not need to create new 
extra-contractual implied warranties as plaintiff and its amicus request. As such, this 
Court should reject plaintiffs request for implied warranties, including a warranty of 
habitability. 
By requesting this Court to adopt implied warranties, including a warranty of 
habitability, plaintiff is asking this Court to require design and construction entities to 
guarantee their work. In SME, this Court rejected plaintiffs argument, stating: "a solid 
majority of jurisdictions have refused to hold that architects and design professionals 
impliedly warrant perfect plans or satisfactory results, but rather, limit the liability of 
architects to those situations in which the professional is negligent in the provision of his 
or her services." SME, 2001 UT 54 at ^[25. Furthermore, this Court cited strong policy 
and practical considerations for refusing to require a professional to guarantee perfect 
results: "Because of the inescapable possibility of error which inheres in these services, 
the law has traditionally required, not perfect results, but rather the exercise of that skill 
and judgment which can be reasonably expected from similarly situated professionals." 
Id. at TJ27 (citation omitted). In summary, this Court stated: "we hold that architects and 
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design professionals do not impliedly warrant or guarantee a perfect plan or satisfactory 
result." Id, at f28. Accordingly, the Court found that any breach of a design 
professional's duty of care was based in the contract for professional services, and the 
duty was only owed to the person to whom the professional services were to be rendered. 
Id. at f30. This Court's holding is consistent with Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-513, which 
requires a defective design or construction claim to be contractual and to be asserted by a 
person in privity of contract. 
Plaintiff has not articulated why this Court's holding in SME does not also apply to 
builders. To the contrary, plaintiffs supporting amicus brief recognizes that Utah has 
refused to adopt an implied warranty of habitability despite repeated requests from 
dissatisfied homeowners. The American Towers opinion articulated the policy reasons 
for refusing to impose additional standards to the parties' relationship: "Builders who 
construct low quality housing that does not cause injury to persons or property may still 
be held liable for damages, but that liability should be defined by the contract between the 
parties." American Towers, 930 P.2d at 1190. "The law of torts imposes no standards on 
the parties' performance of the contract; the only standards are those agreed upon by the 
parties." Id. By requesting this Court to impose implied warranties of habitability, 
plaintiff is essentially requesting this Court to impose tort standards on the performance 
of construction contracts. This Court has rejected this argument, and plaintiff has offered 
no new policy considerations to justify a new rule. Furthermore, the Utah Legislature has 
recently enacted a statute reinforcing this Court's prior decisions that decline to impose 
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implied warranties to design and construction entities. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing authority, amici in support of defendants requests this 
Court to keep the economic loss rule in its current form in place. If this Court were to 
adopt plaintiffs arguments to overrule American Towers, this Court would be adopting a 
rule inconsistent with the policy recently announced by the Utah Legislature. This Court 
has carefully created a well reasoned and predictable rule of law that allows design and 
construction entities to assess and contract for economic expectations and economic 
allocations of risk. 
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